If volcanic ashes were not enough, how about an economic crisis? Greece proved to be a spark for what would be an overhaul of the Euro system which has seen the Euro dollar take a plummeting since the start of the month. The immediate impact of the euro crisis has been (a) a fall in oil prices (b) a fall in long-term interest rates, both of which have transnational implications, which means this would be a good time to examine what exactly is wrong with the Euro and where is it headed.
Perhaps the most startling and frustrating thing about the debate over the fate of the euro is the way almost everyone avoids confronting the core issue. With a unified currency, adjustment to differential shocks requires adjustments in relative wages - and because the nations of the European periphery have gone from boom to bust, their adjustment must be downward. At this point, wages in Greece/Spain/Portugal/Latvia/Estonia etc. need to fall something like 20-30 percent relative to wages in Germany. Of course this would set off wide-spread discontent.
The Greek budget crisis has made it clear that something must be done to limit fiscal deficits in eurozone countries. The attempt to do so with the group's Stability and Growth Pact has failed and there is now political consensus in Europe that new rules are needed to prevent large deficits.
There have been no agreement on what should be done and none expected soon. The European Commission proposed last week that the national budgets of each country be examined by the others before they are approved. It would clearly be anathema to the German government to have its spending and tax policies approved by France, let alone by Greece and Portugal. The problem therefore to find a way to prevent excessive deficits while leaving member states free to shape their own spending and tax policies.
Here something may be learnt from United States. Although the 50 states share a currency and each sets its own spending and tax policies, state deficits remain very low. Even California has a deficit of only about 1 percent of the state's GDP and total general obligation debt of less than 4 percent of state GDP. The basic reason for these small deficits is that each state's constitution prohibits borrowing for operating purposes. In some states, these self-imposed restrictions go back to the 19th century, a time when excessive borrowing led to state defaults. Those states wanted to assure potential lenders that such excess borrowing would not happen again. Over time, all states adopted such rules to help make the bonds they issued for capital expenditures attractive to investors.
If the EMU governments were to adopt similar constitutional rules, the interest rates on their bonds would fall. Of course, important differences exist between EMU members and the U.S. states. Because Europe lacks a central fiscal authority, some provision must be made for temporary deficits when economic conditions warrant. European nations also have national security responsibilities that may require surges in defense spending. But if the budget rules are well articulated, the effectiveness of the fiscal discipline will remain.
Germany recently adopted such a constitutional amendment. Germany's central government must reduce its deficit to 0.35 percent of GDP by 2016 unless a decline in GDP causes a larger deficit. Other EMU nations could follow Germany's example because doing so would bring down their interest rates. The European Central Bank could accelerate this process by restricting collateral to bonds issued by governments with satisfactory constitutional limits on their deficits. The combination of national self-interest in achieving lower interest rates and an ECB rule on allowable collateral would create a powerful restriction on deficits. It would also leave member governments free to determine the structure and levels of their taxes and spending, as long as their decisions did not violate their self-imposed constitutional limits.
Meanwhile, Gold and the US Dollar have been great beneficiaries from the Euro crisis as people seek alternative to the Euro for real value.
Perhaps the most startling and frustrating thing about the debate over the fate of the euro is the way almost everyone avoids confronting the core issue. With a unified currency, adjustment to differential shocks requires adjustments in relative wages - and because the nations of the European periphery have gone from boom to bust, their adjustment must be downward. At this point, wages in Greece/Spain/Portugal/Latvia/Estonia etc. need to fall something like 20-30 percent relative to wages in Germany. Of course this would set off wide-spread discontent.
The Greek budget crisis has made it clear that something must be done to limit fiscal deficits in eurozone countries. The attempt to do so with the group's Stability and Growth Pact has failed and there is now political consensus in Europe that new rules are needed to prevent large deficits.
There have been no agreement on what should be done and none expected soon. The European Commission proposed last week that the national budgets of each country be examined by the others before they are approved. It would clearly be anathema to the German government to have its spending and tax policies approved by France, let alone by Greece and Portugal. The problem therefore to find a way to prevent excessive deficits while leaving member states free to shape their own spending and tax policies.
Here something may be learnt from United States. Although the 50 states share a currency and each sets its own spending and tax policies, state deficits remain very low. Even California has a deficit of only about 1 percent of the state's GDP and total general obligation debt of less than 4 percent of state GDP. The basic reason for these small deficits is that each state's constitution prohibits borrowing for operating purposes. In some states, these self-imposed restrictions go back to the 19th century, a time when excessive borrowing led to state defaults. Those states wanted to assure potential lenders that such excess borrowing would not happen again. Over time, all states adopted such rules to help make the bonds they issued for capital expenditures attractive to investors.
If the EMU governments were to adopt similar constitutional rules, the interest rates on their bonds would fall. Of course, important differences exist between EMU members and the U.S. states. Because Europe lacks a central fiscal authority, some provision must be made for temporary deficits when economic conditions warrant. European nations also have national security responsibilities that may require surges in defense spending. But if the budget rules are well articulated, the effectiveness of the fiscal discipline will remain.
Germany recently adopted such a constitutional amendment. Germany's central government must reduce its deficit to 0.35 percent of GDP by 2016 unless a decline in GDP causes a larger deficit. Other EMU nations could follow Germany's example because doing so would bring down their interest rates. The European Central Bank could accelerate this process by restricting collateral to bonds issued by governments with satisfactory constitutional limits on their deficits. The combination of national self-interest in achieving lower interest rates and an ECB rule on allowable collateral would create a powerful restriction on deficits. It would also leave member governments free to determine the structure and levels of their taxes and spending, as long as their decisions did not violate their self-imposed constitutional limits.
Meanwhile, Gold and the US Dollar have been great beneficiaries from the Euro crisis as people seek alternative to the Euro for real value.
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